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Peter Singer did not invent the animal liberation 
movement, nor did he coin its central term, speciesism. 
But he made both famous, beginning with his essay, 
"Animal Liberation", which appeared in the New York 
Review ofBooks in April, 1973. His book of the same 
title appeared two and a half years later, repeating the 
main philosophical arguments of the essay, but adding 
detailed description of animal experimentation and 
factory farming; connecting the questions about animals 
with the issue about world hunger; and providing both 
a short history of speciesism and a survey of its 
contemporary arguments. l It is, and will probably 
remain, the most distinguished philosophical text to 
include a cookbook.2 
Few philosophy books have had as much popular 
success as Animal Liberation. It has served as the bible, 
and sometimes as the calling card, of the animal 
liberation movement during the past decade and a half, 
paving the way for Tom Regan's more recent volume, 
TheCaseforAnimalRights.3 Though Singer and Regan 
are in substantial agreement when it comes to practical 
questions, they disagree fundamentally about the basis 
of moral claims. 
Singer's basic principle about equality of consid-
eration of interests seems to derive from the idea that 
the central constraint of morality is that one cannot, as 
a moral agent, make special exceptions for one's own 
case. This principle leads to a ranking of interests that 
is invariant under identity shifts. Is it worse that I should 
avoid some inconvenience or that you should lose your 
left foot? If I am thinking morally, I cannot subordinate 
your foot to my convenience, since it is clear that I 
would feel quite differently if it were my foot that was 
at risk. Thus, to appreciate the importance ofyour foot, 
relative to my convenience, I need only, as we say, put 
myself in your shoes. No one disagrees that it is worse 
to starve to death than to wear shabby clothing; 
therefore, I should not buy new clothes but contribute 
to famine relief (or prevention). 
Once we begin to question having special privileges 
to ourselves, or our friends or family or race or sex or 
nation, we must be led to ask whether we can give 
preferential treatment on the basis of species. Singer's 
answer is that we cannot, and that the conventional piety 
about "the sanctity of human life," and the concomitant 
unsanctity of nonhuman animal life, must be rejected 
as immoral. Any· attempt to show that all and only 
humans are morally special must fail, in Singer's view, 
since any plausible, morally relevant characteristic will 
either be possessed by some nonhumans or will not be 
possessed by some humans. This appeal to marginal 
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cases is employed with great effectiveness by Singer. 
To be consistent, it seems, we must either treat animals 
better or humans worse. 
Singer is actually after a bit of both, though some 
readers may have missed the implication.4 I doubt that 
many of the "good terrorists" who break into 
laboratories, release experimental animals, and leave 
behind a copy of Animal Liberation would be equally 
keen to insure that necessary medical research is done 
on suitably retarded human subjects. This side of 
Singer's utilitarian position is harder to miss in his 
later works.5 
AnimalLiberation has bren called "the greatest book 
ever written on animal experimentation,"6 and some 
have taken Singer to be attaeJring animal experimen-
tation in the same wholesale way he attacks factory 
farming and, more generally, meat-eating. In fact, 
however, Singer's attack must be seen to be limited to 
(1) experimentation that is useless (or where the value 
of the actual or expected results is outweighed by the 
suffering involved in the experimental procedures) and 
(2) experimentation that violates the doctrine of equal 
consideration of interests by using nonhumans where 
we would not (even think to) use humans. 
In a recent statement on experimentation, Singer 
makes a couple of revealing remarks. The debate 
between pro- and anti-vivi~tionism often concerns the 
availability of alternative, nonvivi~tionist modes of 
investigation. Animal experimenters claim that animal-
rights activists exaggerate the availability (reliability, 
suitability, or practicality) of alternatives. Animal 
advocates, in reply, insist that there was very little 
interest in looking for alternatives before public clamor 
began. Singer points out that there is a deeper issue: 
Some human diseases involve breakdowns of 
complex interactions in whole organisms, and 
no alternative to the use of a whole living 
organism is lilcely to assist us in understanding 
the nature of such diseases-although if we 
give genuine consideration to the interests of 
nonhuman animals we will not assume that 
this fact alone entitles us to use them to obtain 
this understanding,? 
Singer's assumption here is that a rejection of 
speciesism means that the fact that we can learn about 
certain diseases only by "sacrificing" whole animals 
does not by itselfentail that it is right for us (let alone 
that we have a right) to obtain such knowledge by 
such means. 
Yet Singer is committed, as a utilitarian, to 
recognizing that there are at least possible cUcumstances 
in which such experimentation would be obligatory. 
Bentham himself found no objection to 
the putting of dogs and other inferior animals 
to pain, in the way of medical experiment, 
when that experiment has a determinate object, 
beneficial to mankind, accompanied with a fair 
prospect of the accomplishment of it.s 
This is, indeed, not far from the vivisectionist's usual 
apologia Singer says that he hopes young would-be 
researchers will 
twn instead to tasks such as health education 
and the distribution of our existing medical 
techniques to those places where the need is 
greatest. In that way they will make a greater 
contribution to human health than they would 
every be likely to make by experimenting on 
animals.9 
No doubt, there is much to Singer's claim. The 
extension of existing health-care knowledge to the 
world at large might well be of more pressing 
importance, at present, than the acquisition of new 
knowledge. Average care for all might be preferable to 
better and better care for comparatively few. (How 
important are heart-transplants during famines?) 
Still, it may be difficult not to feel that changing 
circumstances (e. g., AIDSI~ can raise the premium 
on new knowledge. In any event, were the bright day 
of health equality ever to dawn, utilitarians would be 
faced anew with the issues Singer circumvents in the 
above remark. 
In 1985, Singer published his own retrospective of 
"Ten Years of Animal Liberation," reviewing in the 
process works by R. G. Frey, who as a utilitarian has 
attacked animal liberation, and Tom Regan, who has 
attacked utilitarianism as a defender ofanimal rights. ll 
Singer observes that Frey and Regan both "believe that 
it is not clear that utilitarianism leads to vegetarianism 
in the actual world in which we live."12 Frey insists, 
not very convincingly, that the bad consequences of 
mass vegetarianism would outweigh its good 
consequences. Therefore, he thinks, utilitarianism does 
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not require us to become vegetarians or foreswear 
vivisection--au contraire. 13 Regan believes that 
utilitarian objections to factory fanning and animal 
experimentation do not go to the root of the matter. After 
all, if the consequences were different, utilitarianism 
would require us to be carnivores, or to experiment, 
so utilitarianism is incapable of expressing an 
appropriately deep respect for the inherent value ofother 
creatures as subjects-of-a-life. 
In response to Frey, Singer emphasizes all the good 
consequences that would flow from vegetarianism. It 
is likely that most readers would find Singer's case 
more compelling; his prose is certainly more effective. 
But the spectacle can only remind us how Wledifying 
consequentialist rows usually are. Consequentialist 
reasoning is something that often seems to make sense 
on a small scale, but quickly becomes intuitively 
unmanageable as considerations become more and 
more complex. 
In listing the happy consequences of vegetarianism, 
Singerobserves that "since so much ofour meat is grain 
fed, and this is a notoriously wasteful process, there 
will be much more grain available for those who need 
it most"-i. e., the world's hWlgry.14 This encapsulates 
a whole chapler from AnimalLiberation. This argument 
may seem to have an air of economic unreality about 
it Are we to believe that if wealthy meat-producers 
were to stop paying handsomely for grain, the same 
land would be used to produce the same amoWlt ofgrain 
to be donated to the world's hWlgry? The argument 
seems naive. (Are we to make decisions about the 
consequences of vegetarianism on the assumption that 
everyone has been convinced by Singer's argument in 
"Famine, Affluence, and Morality"15 and will act on 
it? Or may we suppose that economic and political 
forces might keep our "sacrifice" from alleviating the 
world's endemic undernourishment?) 
Another possibility is that the utilitarian thing to do 
might be to take the immense profits derived from meat 
production and spend them on population control. 
(Though Singer has maintained, contra Garrett Hardin's 
consequentialist arguments, that eventual famine 
catastrophe is not inevitable, he has conceded that direct 
food relief might not be the required course ofaction.16) 
What the consequences of our actions will be 
depends on how much ofwhat we ought to do is actually 
done. And what we actually ought to do depends on 
what the consequences ofour actioos will be. It is not easy 
to remain undaunted in the face of such complexities. 
In this particular case, a solution may be possible. 
We can understand Singer's argument as a response to 
the claim that since there are so many starving people 
in the world, vegetarianism must be wrong. In other 
words, a commitment to vegetarianism need not be 
incompatible with a commitment to alleviate world 
hunger. We might grant this much without embracing 
the more positive claim that vegetarianism would 
provide an avenue for such alleviation. Understood in 
this modest way, Singer's argument provides an 
unexpected reply to the critic who suggests that starving 
people are more important than suffering animals. 
Singer can say: if you are concerned about starving 
people, then you should become vegetarian. 
Singer recommends vegetarianism as a kind of 
boycott. Part of the strength of this tactic is that it 
appeals to deontologists as much as to utilitarians. The 
utiliarian can say: By not buying meat, I do not 
contribute to causing animal suffering. The deontologist 
can say: By not buying meat, I do not take part in a 
wrongful action. 
Singer does not recommend a boycott ofall medical 
products produced through animal testing. To some, 
this has seemed an inconsistency, but as we have seen, 
Singer cannot, as a utilitarian, oppose all possible foons 
ofanimal experimentation. When experimenters point 
out that a given procedure is based on animal 
experimentation, Singer can say that "to apply the 
treatment now does not require further animal 
experimentation."l? We can use knowledge wrongfully 
acquired, it seems, so long as our use does no further 
wrong. Of course, our purchase of drugs which have 
been tested on animals provides economic support for 
the companies that develop such materials, just as our 
purchase of meat provides support for factory farmers. 
It may be that the social complexities that block 
abolition even of objectionable fonns of experimen-
tation are as baffling as those complexities which block 
just distribution of the world's food supply. As David 
Jaggar has said: 
Individual scientists currently have little 
control over the goals and conduct of their 
research ... [T]he current social order is 
committed systematically to the continuation 
of painful experimentation on animals. Our 
current social system will continue to set 
research goals that include the development 
of ever more lethal weapons, it will continue 
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to proliferate unnecessary luxury items whose 
safety must be tested, and it will continue to 
pollute the environment with carcinogens and 
other toxic substances for which cures must 
be found. Enormous numbers of animals will 
suffer pain in all these research projects. Their 
pain can be eliminated only by a radical 
transformation of social order which generates 
this kind of scientific researeh.18 
Singer has never been shy about calling for radical 
changes in the way people live, nor about defending 
philosophers' title to be "moral experts." In one of his 
earliest essays he declared: 
Moral philosophers have, then, certain 
advantages which could make them, relative 
to those who lack these advantages, experts in 
matters of morals. Of course, to be moral 
experts, it would be necessary for moral 
philosophers to do some fact-finding on 
whatever issue they were considering. Given 
a readiness to tackle normative issues, and 
to look at the relevant facts, it would be 
surprising if moral philosophers were not, in 
general, better suited to arrive at the right, or 
soundly based, moral conclusions than non-
philosophers. Indeed, if this were not the case, 
one might wonder whether moral philosophy 
was worthwhile.19 
If the moral philosophy of the past two decades has 
been worthwhile, that has been in part because of the 
conception of applied ethics exemplified throughout 
Singer's extensive body of work, and pre-eminently in 
Animal Liberation. 
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